Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky (),
Mukul Majumdar and
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Mukul Majumdar: Economics Department - Cornell University - Cornell University [New York]
Radner Roy: Stern School of Business - NYU - New York University [New York] - NYU - NYU System
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This notes reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition for approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially efficient", and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrat's bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.
Keywords: petty corruption; intermediaries; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption with an Intermediary (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00587715
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