Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky (), Mukul Majumdar and Roy Radner
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Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky: PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Mukul Majumdar: Economics Department - Cornell University - Cornell University [New York]

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Abstract: This note reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially efficient", and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrats' bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.

Keywords: Petty corruption; Intermediaries; Game-theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Review of Economic Design, 2009, 13 (1-2), pp.45-57. ⟨10.1007/s10058-008-0068-1⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption with an Intermediary (2008)
Working Paper: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2007)
Working Paper: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754385

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0068-1

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