The Regulation of Entry

Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes () and Andrei Shleifer

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: Countries differ significantly in the way they regulate the entry of new businesses. In this paper, we describe the required procedures governing entry regulation, as well as the time and the cost of following theseprocedures, in seventy-five countries. We focus on legal requirements that need to be met before a business can officially open its doors, the official cost of meeting these requirements and the minimum time it takes to meet them if the government does not delay the process. We then use these data to evaluate three economic theories of regulation. We look at the official requirements, official cost, and official time -- and do not measure explicitly corruption and bureaucratic delays that further raise the cost of entry.

Date: 2001-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Downloads: (external link)
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/reg_entry.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The Regulation of Entry (2002)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2002)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2001)
Working Paper: The regulation of entry (2001)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2000)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2000)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp01-015

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