The Regulation of Entry

Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes () and Andrei Shleifer

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: | Paper

We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public of private goods. Countries with more democraatic and limited governments have fewer entry regulations. The evidence is inconsistent with Pigouvian (helping hand) theories of benevolent regulation, but support the (grabbing hand) view that entry regulation benefits politicans and bureaucrats.

Date: 2000
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Regulation of Entry (2002)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2002)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2001)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2001)
Working Paper: The regulation of entry (2001)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2000)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry
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