The Regulation of Entry

Simeon Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have fewer entry regulations. The evidence is inconsistent with Pigouvian (helping hand) theories of benevolent regulation, but support the (grabbing hand) view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.

Date: 2002
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Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics

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Journal Article: The Regulation of Entry (2002)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2001)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2001)
Working Paper: The regulation of entry (2001)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2000)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry (2000)
Working Paper: The Regulation of Entry
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:30747190

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