Rules versus Home Rule: Local Government Responses to Negative Revenue Shocks

Daniel Shoag, Cody Tuttle and Stan Veuger
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Daniel Shoag: Harvard University

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: Local governments rely heavily on sales tax revenue. We use national bankruptcies of big-box retail chains to study sudden plausibly exogenous revenue shortfalls. Treated localities respond by reducing spending on law enforcement and administrative services. We further study how cities with different degrees of autonomy vary in their response. Cities in home rule states react more swiftly by raising taxes or issuing bonds. A regression discontinuity analysis of cities in Illinois emphasizes that this effect of local autonomy is causal. Home rule cities do not abuse their discretion: their bond ratings are more likely to be strong.

Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mkt and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1580

Related works:
Journal Article: Rules Versus Home Rule—Local Government Responses to Negative Revenue Shocks (2019)
Working Paper: Rules versus home rule: Local government responses to negative revenue shocks (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp17-037

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