Looking beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes

Alberto Chong, Ana L. De La O Torres, Dean Karlan and Leonard Wantchekon
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Ana L. De La O Torres: Yale University
Leonard Wantchekon: Princeton University

Working Papers from Yale University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identification with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to improve political accountability, since voters may respond to information by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the institutional contexts that could allow increased access to information to promote government accountability.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes (2012)
Working Paper: Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes (2012)
Working Paper: Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes (2012)
Working Paper: Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:yaleco:94

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