Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes

Alberto Chong, Ana De La O (ana.delao@yale.edu), Dean Karlan and Leonard Wantchekon
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Ana De La O: Yale University

Working Papers from Economic Growth Center, Yale University

Abstract: Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers'votes, and erodes voters' identifcation with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to improve political accountability, since voters may respond to information by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the institutional contexts that could allow increased access to information to promote government accountability.

Keywords: Corruption; Accountability; Elections; Voting; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2012-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes (2012)
Working Paper: Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes (2012)
Working Paper: Looking beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes (2012)
Working Paper: Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes (2011)
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