Personalities and public sector performance: evidence from a health experiment in Pakistan

Michael Callen, Saad Gulzar, Ali Hasanain, Muhammad Yasir Khan and Arman Rezaee

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper presents evidence that selecting better people to work in government and improving their incentives are complements in improving government effectiveness. To do so, this paper combines a policy that improved incentives for health service delivery in Punjab, Pakistan, with data on health worker personalities. We present three key results. First, government doctors with higher personality scores perform better, even under status quo incentives. Second, health inspectors with higher personality scores exhibit larger treatment responses when incentives are reformed. Last, senior health officials with higher personality scores respond more to data on staff absence by compelling better subsequent attendance.

JEL-codes: D73 H83 I18 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2025-03-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hea
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Published in Economic Development and Cultural Change, 18, March, 2025, 73(3), pp. 1439-1474. ISSN: 0013-0079

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:127766

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