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Personalities and Public Sector Performance: Evidence from a Health Experiment in Pakistan

Michael Callen, Saad Gulzar, Ali Hasanain, Muhammad Khan and Arman Rezaee

No 21180, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper provides evidence that the personalities of policymakers matter for policy. Three results support the relevance of personalities for policy. First, doctors with higher Big Five and Perry Public Sector Motivation scores attend work more and falsify inspection reports less. Second, health inspectors who score higher on these measures exhibit larger treatment responses to increased monitoring. Last, senior health officials with higher personality scores respond more to data on staff absence by compelling better subsequent attendance. These results suggest that interpersonal differences matter are consequential for state performance.

JEL-codes: C93 D02 D73 H11 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-hrm
Note: DEV POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Working Paper: Personalities and Public Sector Performance: Evidence from a Health Experiment in Pakistan (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Personalities and Public Sector Performance: Evidence from a Health Experiment in Pakistan (2015) Downloads
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