Unions and procedural justice: an alternative to the 'common rule'
David Marsden
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
Can unions substitute a procedural justice role for their traditional reliance on establishing a ‘common rule’? The decline of ‘bureaucratic’ models of employee management and the rise of performance pay and performance management conflicts with the common rule as management seek to tie rewards more closely to individual and organisational performance. CEP studies of performance pay in the British public services illustrate the potential for a procedural justice role to ensure that such pay systems are operated fairly, otherwise they risk demotivating staff. Evidence is presented to show that employees regard unions as effective vehicles for procedural justice. In this way, management can achieve better operation of their incentive schemes, and employees may experience less unfairness and poisoned work relations.
Keywords: performance-related pay; public services; procedural justice; management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2004-02
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3633/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Chapter: Unions and Procedural Justice: An Alternative to the ‘Common Rule’ (2004)
Working Paper: Unions and Procedural Justice: An Alternative to the Common Rule (2004) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:3633
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