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Unions and Procedural Justice: An Alternative to the Common Rule

David Marsden

CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: Can unions substitute a procedural justice role for their traditional reliance on establishing a¿common rule¿? The decline of ¿bureaucratic¿ models of employee management and the riseof performance pay and performance management conflicts with the common rule asmanagement seek to tie rewards more closely to individual and organisational performance.CEP studies of performance pay in the British public services illustrate the potential for aprocedural justice role to ensure that such pay systems are operated fairly, otherwise they riskdemotivating staff. Evidence is presented to show that employees regard unions as effectivevehicles for procedural justice. In this way, management can achieve better operation of theirincentive schemes, and employees may experience less unfairness and poisoned workrelations.

Keywords: performance-related pay; public services; procedural justice; management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Chapter: Unions and Procedural Justice: An Alternative to the ‘Common Rule’ (2004)
Working Paper: Unions and procedural justice: an alternative to the 'common rule' (2004) Downloads
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