Awards unbundled: evidence from a natural field experiment

Nava Ashraf, Oriana Bandiera and Scott S. Lee

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Organizations often use non-monetary awards to incentivize performance. Awards may affect behavior through several mechanisms: by conferring employer recognition, by enhancing social visibility, and by facilitating social comparison. In a nationwide health worker training program in Zambia, we design a field experiment to unbundle these mechanisms. We find that employer recognition and social visibility increase performance while social comparison reduces it, especially for low-ability trainees. These effects appear when treatments are announced and persist through training. The findings are consistent with a model of optimal expectations in which low-ability individuals exert low effort in order to avoid information about their relative ability.

Keywords: awards; social comparison; optimal expectations; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D84 J33 M52 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (110)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, April, 2014, 100, pp. 44-63. ISSN: 0167-2681

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61125/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Awards unbundled: Evidence from a natural field experiment (2014)
Working Paper: Awards Unbundled: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:61125

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