Awards unbundled: Evidence from a natural field experiment

Nava Ashraf, Oriana Bandiera and Scott S. Lee

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014, vol. 100, issue C, 44-63

Abstract: Organizations often use non-monetary awards to incentivize performance. Awards may affect behavior through several mechanisms: by conferring employer recognition, by enhancing social visibility, and by facilitating social comparison. In a nationwide health worker training program in Zambia, we design a field experiment to unbundle these mechanisms. We find that employer recognition and social visibility increase performance while social comparison reduces it, especially for low-ability trainees. These effects appear when treatments are announced and persist through training. The findings are consistent with a model of optimal expectations in which low-ability individuals exert low effort in order to avoid information about their relative ability.

Keywords: Awards; Social comparison; Optimal expectations; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D84 J33 M52 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (110)

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Working Paper: Awards unbundled: evidence from a natural field experiment (2014)
Working Paper: Awards Unbundled: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:100:y:2014:i:c:p:44-63

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.001

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