Strategic Entry and Potential Competition - Evidence from Compressed Gas Fuel Retail
Andrea Pozzi and
Gabriele Rovigatti ()
Additional contact information
Giulia Pavan: Toulouse School of Economics
No 1709, EIEF Working Papers Series from Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)
We study the effect of competition on preemption incentives. An unexpected change in regulation in the Italian retail market for compressed natural gas fuel allows us to identify the potential entrants to the market and creates exogenous variation in their number. We document that areas with a larger pool of potential competitors experience faster entry. We provide evidence suggesting that this occurs because facing a higher number of potential entrants raises firms' incentives to preempt.
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2017, Revised 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Strategic entry and potential competition: Evidence from compressed gas fuel retail (2020)
Working Paper: Strategic Entry and Potential Competition: Evidence from Compressed Gas Fuel Retail (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eie:wpaper:1709
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in EIEF Working Papers Series from Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Facundo Piguillem ().