Strategic Entry and Potential Competition: Evidence from Compressed Gas Fuel Retail
Andrea Pozzi and
Gabriele Rovigatti ()
No 12113, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We study the effect of competition on preemption incentives. An unexpected change in regulation in the Italian retail market for compressed natural gas fuel allows us to identify the potential entrants and creates exogenous variation in their number. We document that markets with a larger pool of potential competitors experience faster entry. We provide evidence suggesting that this occurs because a larger number of potential entrants raises firms' incentives to preempt.
Keywords: potential entrants; preemption; retail fuel market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L22 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Strategic entry and potential competition: Evidence from compressed gas fuel retail (2020)
Working Paper: Strategic Entry and Potential Competition - Evidence from Compressed Gas Fuel Retail (2017)
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