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Fairness Versus Efficiency - An Experimental Study of (Mutual) Gift Giving -

Werner Güth (), Hartmut Kliemt and Axel Ockenfels

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Retributive responses do play a role in human behavior. Whether they are primarily triggered by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions is an important question. It can be addressed by experimental studies of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor may inflict harmful consequences without intending and intend harmful consequences without inflicting them. Our experimental results indicate that retributive responses are more strongly influenced by observed consequences than by ascribed intentions. However, individual retributive motivations seem to be overshadowed by concerns that are non-retributive altogether in that they focus on end state distributions independently of who brought them about.

Keywords: Fairness; Efficiency; reciprocity; Experimental Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Fairness versus efficiency: An experimental study of (mutual) gift giving (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Fairness versus efficiency: An experimental study of (mutual) gift giving (2000) Downloads
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