Path Dependence Without Denying Deliberation - An Exercise Model Connecting Rationality and Evolution -

Werner Gueth () and Manfred Stadler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices are made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past success (the shadow of the past) as typical in evolutionary biology. Indirect evolution does not consider the two opposite approaches as mutually exclusive but allows to combine them in various ways (Berninghaus et al., 2003). Here we provide a simple application allowing any linear combination of rational deliberation and path dependence, i.e. of the two "shadows".

Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-hpe and nep-tid
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: Path Dependence Without Denying Deliberation: An Exercise Model Connecting Rationality and Evolution (2004)
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