Path Dependence Without Denying Deliberation: An Exercise Model Connecting Rationality and Evolution

Werner Güth () and Manfred Stadler

No 282, Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge from University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics

Abstract: Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices are made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past success (the shadow of the past) as typical in evolutionary biology. Indirect evolution does not consider the two opposite approaches as mutually exclusive but allows to combine them in various ways (Berninghaus et al., 2003). Here we provide a simple application allowing any linear combination of rational deliberation and path dependence, i.e. of the two "shadows".

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Path Dependence Without Denying Deliberation - An Exercise Model Connecting Rationality and Evolution - (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tuedps:282

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