Loss aversion and learning to bid
Dennis Dittrich,
Werner Güth (),
Martin Kocher and
Paul Pezanis-Christou
Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group
Abstract:
Bidding challenges learning theories since experiences for the same bid vary stochastically: the same choice can result in a gain or a loss. In such an environment the question arises how the nearly universally documented phenomenon of loss aversion affects the adaptive dynamics. We analyze the impact of loss aversion in a simple auction for different learning theories. Our experimental results suggest that a version of reinforcement learning which accounts for loss aversion fares as well as more sophisticated alternatives.
Keywords: loss aversion; bidding; auction; experiment; learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
Downloads: (external link)
ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2005-03.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Failed to connect to FTP server papers.econ.mpg.de: No such host is known.
Related works:
Journal Article: Loss Aversion and Learning to Bid (2012) 
Working Paper: Loss aversion and learning to bid (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2005-03
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.econ.mpg. ... arch/ESI/discuss.php
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Karin Richter ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).