Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments

Werner Güth (), Maria Levati, Matthias Sutter and Eline van der Heijden ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contribution experiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group member contribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadership increases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism, especially so when it goes along with authority in the form of granting the leader exclusion power. Whether leadership is fixed or rotating among group members has no significant influence on contributions. Only a minority of groups succeeds in endogenously installing a leader, even though groups with leaders are much more efficient than groups without a leader.

Keywords: Voluntary contribution experiment; leadership; exclusion power; endogenous selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2007)
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