Learning Foundations and Complexity of the Cursed Equilibrium
Topi Miettinen ()
Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group
Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundation for the partially cursed equilibrium. This paper closes the gap by showing that a partially cursed equilibrium corresponds to a particular analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
Keywords: Analogy Expectations; Bounded Rationality; Curse; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2006-40
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