Pork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework

Guillaume Frechette (), John Kagel and Massimo Morelli ()

No ECO2010/37, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: There is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the ‘mixed’ region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer ower is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.

Keywords: Legislative Bargaining; Public Goods; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C52 C7 C92 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Journal Article: Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2010/37

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