Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games

Pierpaolo Battigalli ()

Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: The authors argue that the rationalizability approach is particularly appropriate to analyze games with genuine incomplete information.

Keywords: INFORMATION; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 63 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco99/17

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