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Limited farsightedness in priority-based matching

Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 2022/438, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider priority-based matching problems with limited farsightedness. We show that, once agents are sufficiently farsighted, the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm becomes stable: a singleton set consisting of the TTC matching is a horizon-$k$ vNM stable set if the degree of farsightedness is greater than three times the number of agents in the largest cycle of the TTC. On the contrary, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm may not belong to any horizon-$k$ vNM stable set for $k$ large enough.

Keywords: Priority-based matching; top trading cycle; stable sets; limited farsightedness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 D47 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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