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Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching

Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

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Abstract: We consider priority-based matching problems with limited farsightedness. We show that, once agents are sufficiently farsighted, the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm becomes stable: a singleton set consisting of the TTC matching is a horizon-$k$ vNM stable set if the degree of farsightedness is greater than three times the number of agents in the largest cycle of the TTC. On the contrary, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm may not belong to any horizon-$k$ vNM stable set for $k$ large enough.

Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Limited farsightedness in priority-based matching (2022) Downloads
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