Matching markets with farsighted couples

Ata Atay, Sylvain Funck, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
Additional contact information
Sylvain Funck: CORE/LIDAM and CEREC, UCLouvai
Vincent Vannetelbosch: CORE/LIDAM and CEREC, UCLouvai

No 2023/445, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which match- ings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching is stable. Thus, matchings that are stable with myopic agents remain stable when agents become farsighted. Examples of farsighted stable sets containing multiple non-stable matchings are provided for markets with and without stable matchings. For couples markets where the farsighted sta- ble set does not exist, we propose the DEM farsighted stable set to predict the matchings that are stable when agents are farsighted.

Keywords: Matching with couples; stable sets; farsighted agents. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/197820 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Matching markets with farsighted couples (2024)
Working Paper: Matching markets with farsighted couples (2023)
Working Paper: Matching markets with farsighted couples (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ewp:wpaper:445web

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