Matching markets with farsighted couples

Ata Atay, Sylvain Funck, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which matchings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching is stable. Thus, matchings that are stable with myopic agents remain stable when agents become farsighted. Examples of farsighted stable sets containing multiple non-stable matchings are provided for markets with and without stable matchings. For couples markets where the farsighted stable set does not exist, we propose the DEM farsighted stable set to predict the matchings that are stable when agents are farsighted.

Date: 2023-04, Revised 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2304.12276 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Matching markets with farsighted couples (2024)
Working Paper: Matching markets with farsighted couples (2023)
Working Paper: Matching markets with farsighted couples (2023)
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