Incentives, Pro-social Preferences and Discrimination

Raphael Soubeyran

No 2019.04, Working Papers from FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists

Abstract: In this paper, I study how a principal can provide incentives, at minimal cost, to a group of agents who have pro-social preferences in order to induce successful coordination in the presence of network externalities. I show that agents’ pro-social preferences – specifically a preference for the sum of the agents payoffs and for the minimum payoff – lead to a decrease in the implementation cost for the principal, a decrease in the payoff of each agent, and an increase in discrimination. The model can be applied in various contexts and it delivers policy implications for designing policies that support the adoption of new technologies, for motivating a group of workers, or for inducing successful coordination of NGOs.

Keywords: incentives; externality; principal; agents; pro-social (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D82 D86 D91 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: XX pages
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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http://faere.fr/pub/WorkingPapers/Soubeyran_FAERE_WP2019.04.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination (2019)
Working Paper: Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fae:wpaper:2019.04

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