Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination
Raphael Soubeyran ()
CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro
In this paper, I study how a principal can provide incentives, at minimal cost, to a group of agents who have pro-social preferences in order to induce successful coordination in the presence of network externalities. I show that agents' pro-social preferences - specifically a preference for the sum of the agents' payoffs and/or for the minimum payoff - lead to a decrease in the implementation cost for the principal, a decrease in the payoff of each agent and an increase in discrimination. The model can be applied in various contexts and it delivers policy implications for designing policies that support the adoption of new technologies, for motivating a group of workers or for inducing successful coordination of NGOs.
Keywords: principal; agents; pro-social preferences; incentives; externality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02056347
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Incentives, Pro-social Preferences and Discrimination (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpceem:hal-02056347
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laurent Garnier ().