Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games

Timothy Cason, Anya Samek and Roman Sheremeta

Artefactual Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website

Abstract: Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for order-statistic coordination games. Subjects play the minimum- and median-effort coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show the precedent for cooperative behavior spills over from the median game to the minimum game when the games are played sequentially, but not when they are played simultaneously. Moreover, spillover occurs even when group composition changes, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior does not spill over from the minimum game to the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://s3.amazonaws.com/fieldexperiments-papers2/papers/00423.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Behavioral spillovers in coordination games (2012)
Working Paper: Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games (2011)
Working Paper: Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:feb:artefa:00423

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Artefactual Field Experiments from The Field Experiments Website
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Francesca Pagnotta ().