Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games

Timothy Cason, Anya Savikhin and Roman Sheremeta

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for minimum- and median-effort coordination games. Subjects play these coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show that successful coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium in the median game influences behavior in the minimum game when the games are played sequentially. Moreover, this positive, Pareto-improving spillover is present even when group composition changes across games, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior in the minimum game does not influence play in the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations.

Keywords: coordination; order-statistic games; experiments; cooperation; minimum game; median game; behavioral spillover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52106/1/MPRA_paper_52106.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Behavioral spillovers in coordination games (2012)
Working Paper: Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games (2011)
Working Paper: Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:52106

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().