The Effect of Tracking Students by Ability into Different Schools: A Natural Experiment
Nina Guyon,
Eric Maurin and
Sandra McNally
No 2010.152, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Abstract:
The tracking of pupils by ability into elite and non-elite schools represents a controversial policy in many countries. There is no consensus on how large the elite track should be and little agreement on the effects of any further increase in its size. This paper presents a natural experiment where the increase in the size of the elite track was followed by a significant improvement in average educational outcomes. This experiment provides a rare opportunity to isolate the overall effect of allowing entry to the elite track for a group that was previously only at the margin of being admitted.
Keywords: Education; Tracking; Selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effect of Tracking Students by Ability into Different Schools: A Natural Experiment (2012) 
Working Paper: The Effect of Tracking Students by Ability into Different Schools: A Natural Experiment (2012)
Working Paper: The Effect of Tracking Students by Ability into Different Schools: A Natural Experiment (2012)
Working Paper: The Effect of Tracking Students by Ability into Different Schools: A Natural Experiment (2012)
Working Paper: The Effect of Tracking Students by Ability into Different Schools: a Natural Experiment (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.152
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