Subordinated debt and prompt corrective regulatory action
Douglas Evanoff and
Larry Wall
No 2002-18, FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Abstract:
Several recent studies have recommended greater reliance on subordinated debt as a tool to discipline bank risk taking. Some of these proposals recommend using subordinated debt yield spreads as additional triggers for supervisory discipline under prompt corrective action (PCA), action that is currently prompted by capital adequacy measures. This paper provides a theoretical model describing how use of a second market-measure of bank risk, in addition to the supervisors? own internalized information, could improve bank discipline. The authors then empirically evaluate the implications of the model. The evidence suggests that subordinated debt spreads dominate the current capital measures used to trigger PCA and consideration should be given to using spreads to complement supervisory discipline. The evidence also suggests that spreads over corporate bonds may be preferred to using spreads over U.S. Treasuries.
Keywords: Bank supervision; Debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.atlantafed.org/-/media/documents/resea ... s/wp/2002/wp0218.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Subordinated debt and prompt corrective regulatory action (2003) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedawp:2002-18
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in FRB Atlanta Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Rob Sarwark ().