The Federal Reserve System and World War I: Designing Policies without Precedent
Margaret Jacobson and
Ellis Tallman ()
No 1510, Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
The Federal Reserve System failed to prevent the collapse of intermediation during the Great Depression (1929-1933) and took action as if it was unaware of policies that should have been taken in the event of widespread bank runs. The National Banking Era panics and techniques to alleviate them should have been useful references for how to alleviate a financial crisis. We suggest that the overwhelming effort to finance World War I combined with a perspective held by contemporary Federal Reserve officials that the central bank legislation was sufficient to overcome financial crises are key reasons why the historical experiences were overlooked.
Keywords: Crisis prevention; liquidity provision; Federal Reserve Act (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E61 N22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-his, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.clevelandfed.org/~/media/content/newsr ... orld%20war%20i%20pdf Full text (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwp:1510
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers (Old Series) from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().