Landlords and Access to Opportunity
Hal Martin () and
David Phillips ()
No 201902R2, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Landlords in high-opportunity neighborhoods screen out tenants using vouchers. In our correspondence experiment, signaling voucher status cuts landlord responses in half. This voucher penalty increases with posted rent and varies little with signals of tenant quality and race. We repeat the experiment after a policy change and test how landlords respond to raising voucher payment limits by $450 per month in high-rent neighborhoods. Most landlords do not change their screening behavior; those who do respond are few and operate at small scale. Our results suggest a successful, systematic policy of moving to opportunity would require more direct engagement with landlords.
Keywords: Housing Choice Voucher; opportunity neighborhood; Small Area Fair Market Rent; landlord; SAFMR; mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 73 pages
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Note: First version January 2019 under the title “Can Landlords Be Paid to Stop Avoiding Voucher Tenants?” Second version (with current title) August 2019.
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https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-201902r2 Full text (text/html)
Working Paper: Landlords and Access to Opportunity (2019)
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