A Note on Aggregating Preferences for Redistribution

Daniel Carroll, André Victor Doherty Luduvice and Eric Young

No 24-27, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Abstract: The policy predictions of standard heterogeneous agent macroeconomic models are often at odds with observed policies. We use the 2021 General Social Survey to investigate the drivers of individuals' preferences over taxes and redistribution. We find that these preferences are more strongly associated with political identity than with economic status. We discuss the implications for quantitative macroeconomic models with endogenous policy determination.

Keywords: political economy; redistribution; heterogeneous agents; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E62 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2024-11-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedcwq:99166

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DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-202427

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