EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Capital structure and firm performance: a new approach to testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry

Allen Berger () and Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti ()

No 2002-54, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: Corporate governance theory predicts that leverage affects agency costs and thereby influences firm performance. We propose a new approach to test this theory using profit efficiency, or how close a firm's profits are to the benchmark of a best-practice firm facing the same exogenous conditions. We are also the first to employ a simultaneous-equations model that accounts for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We also control for measures of ownership structure in the tests. We find that data on the U.S. banking industry are consistent with the theory, and the results are statistically significant, economically significant, and robust.

Keywords: Bank capital; Capitalization; Banks and banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mfd
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200254/200254abs.html (text/html)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200254/200254pap.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Capital structure and firm performance: A new approach to testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry (2006) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2002-54

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2022-01-21
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2002-54