The economics of two-sided payment card markets: pricing, adoption and usage
James McAndrews and
Zhu Wang
No RWP 08-12, Research Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Abstract:
This paper provides a new theory for two-sided payment card markets by positing better microfoundations. Adopting payment cards by consumers and merchants requires a fixed cost, but yields lower marginal costs of making payments. Considering this together with the heterogeneity of consumer income and merchant size, our theory derives card adoption and usage pattern consistent with cross-section and time-series evidence. Our analyses also help explain the observed card pricing pattern, particularly the rising merchant (interchange) fees over time. This is because a private card network, besides internalizing the two-sided market externality, has the incentive to inflate the card transaction value. We show that privately determined card pricing, adoption and usage tend to deviate from the social optimum, and imposing a ceiling on interchange fees may improve consumer welfare. ; Also issued as a Payments System Research Working Paper.
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-mkt and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
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Working Paper: The economics of two-sided payment card markets: pricing, adoption and usage (2012) 
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