Privacy Regulation and Quality Investment
Yassine Lefouili and
Ying Lei Toh
No RWP 19-5, Research Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
This paper analyzes whether a privacy regulation that restricts a dominant firm?s data disclosure level harms the firm?s incentives to invest in service quality and thereby harms social welfare. We study how the regulation affects the privacy and quality choices of a monopoly service provider, who derives revenues solely from disclosing user data to third parties, as well as how those choices in turn affect consumers? participation and information-sharing decisions. We show that the regulation does not always harm investment incentives; moreover, even when it does, it may still improve social welfare.
Keywords: Privacy Regulation; Data Disclosure; Investment; Quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L15 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/343/pdf-Pr ... ity%20Investment.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden
Working Paper: Privacy Regulation and Quality Investment (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedkrw:rwp19-05
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Research Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().