Universal banking, allocation of control rights, and corporate finance in Germany

William Emmons and Frank A. Schmid

No 1998-001, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Abstract: Corporate governance practices differ greatly in the United States and Germany. This paper describes the main institutional features of the German corporate governance system, focusing on universal banks and codetermination. The paper also summarizes existing empirical evidence that has investigated how- and how well- this system works.

Keywords: Germany; Banks and banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 1998, 80(4), pp. 19-42

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedlwp:1998-001

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DOI: 10.20955/wp.1998.001

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