Framing and Misperceptions in a Public Good Experiment
Toke Reinholt Fosgaard (),
Lars Hansen () and
Erik Wengström ()
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Toke Reinholt Fosgaard: Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
No 2011/11, IFRO Working Paper from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics
Earlier studies have found that a substantial part of the contributions in public good games can be explained by subjects misperceiving the game's incentives. Using a large-scale public good experiment, we show that subtle changes in how the game is framed substantially affect such misperceptions and that this explains major parts of framing effect on subjects' behavior. When controlling for the different levels of misperception between frames, the framing effect on subjects' cooperation preferences disappears.
Keywords: Public goods; Cooperation; Misperception; Framing effects; Internet experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 C90 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pol
Date: 2011-07, Revised 2012-10
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Journal Article: Framing and Misperception in Public Good Experiments (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2011_11
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