Cooperation, framing and political attitudes
Toke R. Fosgaard (),
Lars Hansen () and
Erik Wengström ()
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Toke R. Fosgaard: Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
No 2017/02, IFRO Working Paper from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics
This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.
Keywords: Cooperation; Social Dilemma; Political Ideology; Experiment; Simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 75 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes (2019)
Working Paper: Cooperation, Framing and Political Attitudes (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2017_02
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