Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence
T. Erikson and
Mette Lausten ()
Working Papers from Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics
This study examines the determinants of managerial compensation in a sample of Danish firms testing hypothesis derived from agency theory in the seldomly studied (European) institutional setting of relationship-oriented governance systems. We find pay-performance sensitivity similar to that found in other settings, small differences in sensitivity across individual levels and no evidence in support of the career concern hypothesis.
Keywords: MANAGEMENT; COMPENSATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Managerial pay and firm performance -- Danish evidence (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aascbu:97-11
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