Managerial pay and firm performance -- Danish evidence

Tor Eriksson and Mette Lausten ()

Scandinavian Journal of Management, 2000, vol. 16, issue 3, 269-286

Abstract: This study examines the determinants of managerial compensation in a sample of Danish firms, and tests hypotheses derived from agency theory in the seldom studied (European) institutional setting of relationship-oriented governance systems. We find pay-performance sensitivity similar to that found in other settings, small differences in sensitivity across management levels, and no evidence in support of the career concern hypothesis.

Keywords: Managerial; pay; Firm; performance; Agency; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Managerial Pay and Firm Performance: Danish Evidence (1997)
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