Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation

Nahum Melamad, Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Date: 1996-09
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Journal Article: Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation (1997)
Working Paper: Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation (1996)
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