Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation

N. Melamad, Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Abstract: In settings where the Revelation Principle applies, delegation arrangements are frequently inferior to centralized decision-making, and at best achieve the same level of performance.This paper studies the value of delegation when organizations are constrained by a bound on the number of contingencies in any contract.

Keywords: CONTRACTS; ENTERPRISES; MANAGEMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K10 K12 L10 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Journal Article: Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation (1997)
Working Paper: Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostin:70

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