Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives

Assar Lindbeck and Dennis Snower

Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies

Abstract: The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - the move from occupational specialization toward multi-tasking - for centralized wage bargaining. The analysis shows how, on account of this reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly inefficient and detrimental to firms' profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropirate mix of tasks.

Keywords: BUSINESS ORGANIZATION; EMPLOYMENT; UNEMPLOYMENT; BARGAINING; WAGE DETERMINATION; TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 E24 J31 J64 L22 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives (2012)
Working Paper: Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking and Work Incentives (1999)
Working Paper: Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives (1997)
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