Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking and Work Incentives

Assar Lindbeck and Dennis Snower

No 620, Seminar Papers from Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies

Abstract: The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - the move from occupational specialization toward multi-tasking - for centralized wage bargaining. The analysis shows how, on account of this reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly nefficient and detrimental to firms’ profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropriate mix of tasks. The paper also shows how centralized bargaining inhibits firms from using wages to induce workers to learn how to use their experience from one set of tasks to enhance their performance at other tasks. In this way, the paper helps explain the increasing resistance to centralized bargaining in various advanced market economies.

Keywords: Centralized wage bargaining; restructuring; organization of firms; technological change; information flows; employment; wage formation; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D80 E24 J30 J50 L20 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1997-10-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives (2012)
Working Paper: Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking and Work Incentives (1999)
Working Paper: Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives (1997)
Working Paper: Centralised Bargaining, Multitasking and Work Incentives (1996)
Working Paper: Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0620

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