Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions

Martin Dufwenberg and W. Guth

Working Papers from Uppsala - Working Paper Series

Abstract: Two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or through (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for agents to care for sales, or evolve as sellers who care for sales in addition to profits. The two approaches are conceptually quite different, yet similar in the sense that both allow certain kinds of commitment.

Keywords: DUOPOLIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Working Paper: Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions (1998)
Working Paper: Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions (1997)
Working Paper: Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions (1997)
Working Paper: Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:uppaal:1998-09

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